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TWO YEARS' EXPERIENCE WITH THE BRIGGS
LAW (1928-30) OF MASSACHUSETTSf"
Winfred Overholser,*
It is probably unnecessary, in view of the fact that ten years
have elapsed since its passage, to enter into a full discussion of the
nature of the Briggs Law or of the reasons for its existence. It is
recognized generally by writers on legal psychiatric matters as a
singularly advanced piece of legislation in that portion of the field
of criminal law which deals with the questions of responsibility, tri-
ability and disposition. In practice, likewise, it has steadily and
progressively demonstrated itself to be a valued aid in the administra-
tion of criminal justice.
Previously, several detailed studies of the operation and results
of the law have been published.' It is the intention of the present
contribution to bring more nearly up to date these existing reports
on the functioning of the law, to detail certain pertinent judicial de-
cisions, and to indicate such change in the law as has been enacted
during the period considered, namely from October 15, 1928 to Octo-
ber 15, 1930.
The Briggs Law is that portion of the General Laws of the
tPresented before the Mass. Psychiatric Society at Boston, December 30,1931.
*M. D., Assistant Commissioner of Mental Diseases, Boston, Massachusetts.
'For other articles on this subject see: D. A. Thorn. "Medico-Legal
Provision in the State of Massachusetts Relative to the Mental Condition
of Certain Persons Held for Trial," Amer. Jour. Psychiatry, III, 219-224.
S. S. Glueck: "State Legislation Providing for the Mental Examination of
Persons Accused of Crime," Bulletin Mass. Dept. of Mental Diseases, VII,
16-26. "Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime," 36 Yale
Law Journal, pp. 632-648, March, 1927. Reprinted in Mental Hygiene XI,
287-305. Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law, Boston, 1925-55-56, 8-72,
474-476. L. V. Briggs: "Conditions and Events Leading to the Passage
of the Massachusetts Law commonly called the "Briggs Law," Bulletin
Mass. Department of Mental Diseases XII, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 2-5. W.
Overholser. "Psychiatric Examination of Prisoners in Massacnusetts,'
Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, Vol. 195, 1065-1067. "Psychiatry and
the Courts in Massachusetts." Journ. American Institute Criminal Law
and Criiinology, XIX, 76-83. "Practical Operation of the Mass. Law
Requiring the Psychiatric Examination of Certain Persons Accused of
Crime," Mass. Law Quarterly XIII, 3549. (Reprinted from Bulletin Mass.
Dept. Mental Diseases, XII, Nos. 1 and 2, October, 1928) "Psychiatr
and the Massachusetts Courts as Now Related," Social Forces, VIIW
No. 1, pp. 77-87, Sept., 1929.
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Commonwealth known as Section 100A, Chapter 123, as amended, 2
which provides for the automatic examination by the Department of
Mental Diseases of certain persons accused of crime, namely those
indicted for a capital offense and those indicted or bound over for a
felony who have been previously convicted of a felony or indicted
more than once for any offense. The less formal appellation is
usually applied by reason of the fact that the law was conceived by
Dr. L. Vernon Briggs, distinguished former President of this Society,
and was enacted largely through his untiring efforts. The principle
of this law, combining as it does the automatic feature with impartial
examinations made under the auspices of a department in the admin-
istrative, rather than the judicial branch of government, is novel,
and even after ten years is still unique. Although several other States
have considered such legislation, none has yet adopted it.
One of the tangible indices of the development of the law is the
steadily increasing number of examinations made under its provisions.
Prior to 1927 the duty of reporting to the Department the names of
prisoners examinable under the law was imposed upon the clerk of
the court.3 Although the capital cases were regularly reported, many
of the other felony cases were not, since the clerk is not required to
know of the previous record of a defendant. On July 1, 1927 an
amendment became effective, by the terms of which the probation
officer, whose duty it is to know of such previous records, is obliged
to notify the clerk of any prior convictions of felony or of previous
indictments, the clerk, in turn being given the duty of acting upon this
information by reporting to the Department. The response to this
amendment was immediate. For the years 1921-26 the annual average
number of cases reported had been eighty-four; for the years ending
October 15 the number increased thus: 1927, one hundred thirty-eight;
1928, two hundred thirty-nine; 1929, three hundred seventy; 1930, six
hundred fifty-four-a jump in four years of 678Y/2%. Another in-
dication of the increasing efficiency of reporting is found in the fact
that whereas up to October 1926 only 53% of the cases reported were
of persons held for other than a capital offense, that percentage had
risen- in the ending October 15, 1930 to 96.2! These figures seem to
warrant the inference that the cases reported recently represent more
nearly than before a cross-section of the serious offenders who come
before our courts.
2Chapter 415, Acts of 1921.
Chapter 331, Acts of 1923.
Chapter 169, Acts of 1925.
sSection 1, Chapter 59, Acts of 1927.
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During the two year period under consideration, ten hundred
twenty-four persons were reported to the Department of Mental Di-
seases for examination, of whom eight hundred four were examined.
For one reason or another, then, two hundred twenty or 21.4% of
these persons were not examined. It may be noted, in passing, that
this proportion has remained almost constant, the figure for the entire
period from 1921 to 1930 being 22.8%. It may be wondered why only
four-fifths of those reported are actually examined. A detailed study
of the reasons for the 1929 failures showed the following results:
Out on bail .............................................. 38
Disposed of before examination... ........................ 19
Not examined under law .................................. 18
Not located .............................................. 5
Discharged or nol prossed .................................. 3
Prisoner or parents refused ................................ 2.
In House of Correction on another charge ................. 1
Attorney refused ........................................ 1
87
The predominant reason, then, is that the prisoner is at liberty on
bail. An attempt is made uniformly to contact these persons, and
with moderate success, but a considerable number do not see fit -to
travel to the examiner to undergo a test of which they are suspicious
and of which they fail to see the purpose. It seems to be the travel
rather than the examination which is the controlling factor, however,
as the refusal of a defendant in jail to submit to examination is
almost unknown (3 in 1929, 1 in 1930). He may, to be sure, decline
until he receives his attorney's approval, but this is nearly always
forthcoming.
The group of those disposed of before examination, is one which
is steadily decreasing. The Attorney General, in his report for 1929,
commented as follows upon this statute: "If eight years of psychiatric
examination have shown that penal restraints could not effect the
reform or conviction of one fifth of capital and second offenders,
future dispositions should be aided by a positive requirement that
such examinations should be made and report thereon be available to
the court at the earliest possible moment".4 Although no such positive
requirements has been enacted, it is a fact that the judges are increas-
ingly following the practice of insisting upon having the report
available before they dispose of the defendant's case.
A considerable group of prisoners are referred who technically
4Report of Attorney General (Public Document No. 12) 1929, p. 27.
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are not examinable-that is, they have not been indicted more than
once or have not been previously convicted of a felony. The clerk
on one district court, for example, makes it a practice to report all
defendants bound over for a felony, whether or not they are known
to have a previous record, saying that at least he will not err by
failing to report any whose names should be sent in! The inclusion
of these names in the total, although increasing the number of
prisoners not examined, does not indicate a weakness of the law.
To sum up, we may say that a certain discrepancy between the
numbers reported and those examined must be expected. Some de-
crease is to be expected by reason of the developing, insistence of the
judges upon having the report at hand. Probably, however, many of
those on bail will continue to be missed, as the degree of compulsion
which may be exercised in securing the examination is doubtful.
The type of offense alleged to have been committed by the de-
fendants examined is of some interest. Against the eight hundred four
persons studied there stood at least eleven hundred seventy-seven
indictments (the number is not always given in the clerk's report, so
this figure is an understatement). Of this number, forty-five were
for a capital offense, two for murder in the second degree, and
eighteen for manslaughter. Against the remainder were placed the
following charges: larceny, three hundred fifty-two; breaking and
entering (including what in most states is termed burglary), three
hundred sixteen; robbery, eighty-four; sex offenses (mostly rape and
carnal abuse) eighty-four; assault with intent to rob or kill, seventy-
three; other offenses, two hundred three. Incidentally, it may be
observed that the number of indictments for robbery in this group
'increased from twenty-three in 1929 to sixty-one in 1930, and those
for felonious assault of one kind or another from twenty-four to
forty-nine. Whether this indicates a true increase in these types of
crime or merely greater activity on the part of grand juries in finding
separate indictments is a question that cannot be answered positively
on these limited data.
Our interest as psychiatrists naturally centers on the results of
the examinations-what were the psychiatric -findings, and what was
done by the courts after receiving the reports of the examinations?
Of the eight hundred four defendants, one hundred thirty-eight, or
17.1.7o, were stated to be clearly or suggestively abnormal mentally,
the reports being as follows: "insane", seven; should be observed in
a mental hospital, thirty-nine; mentally defective, seventy-one; "in-
ferior intelligence", six; dull or borderline intelligence, ten; psycho-
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pathic personality, two; epilepsy, two; brain injury with limited re-
sponsibility, one. Two features stand out-first, the infrequency of
the diagnosis of psychopathic personality, suggesting the examiners'
native antipathy to this dubious classification, or else lack of adequate
social data concerning the defendant; second, the interesting fact'that
although in "1928 the general average of all cases up to these reported
to be abnormal was 21.59, it is only 17.1% for the 1928-30 period!
For the entire period from 1921 to 1930, thirteen hundred sixty-five
defendants have been examined, of whom two hundred fifty-nine, or
18.9%, have been reported to be other than having "no mental disease
or defect".
What became of this group of one hundred thirty-eight de-
"fendants who were found to be distinctly deviates from mental nor-
mality or at least in such condition that observation in a mental
hospital appeared called for? At least one would suppose that if a
prisoner were reported to be frankly "insane" the court, with all the
facilities readily available to it, would commit him to a state hospital
under the safeguards which the law amply provides. As a matter
of fact, this was done in four instances out of a possible seven (in
one other instance the case was filed because the defendant was,
already in the Bridgewater State Hospital). Of the two insane
defendants not committed, one was sent to State Prison and one to
the Lyman School. The latter defendant, a young boy who was
clearly psychotic, was immediately recognized as such at the Lyman
School, and Was committed within a few days to a state hospital! In
this case there had been much notoriety, and the court was apparently
fearful that "mollycoddling" would be charged if the youth were
sent to a hospital.
If the courts did fairly well in this group, what of the men
recommended for observation? There were thirty-nine of these, as
we have seen; of these eighteen, or slightly less than one half, were
committed to a hospital as advised by the Department's examiners.
'Of the rest, one was committeed to the Department for Defective
Delinquents; four were sent to the State Prison, three to the Re-
formatory, aiid seven to the House of.Correction; two were placed
on probation, and four of the cases were filed.* Some of these results
sound almost fantastic, and are difficult to explain. Either, it may
be, the judge considered himself a better critic of the defendant's
mentality than the psychiafrists, or he labored under the outworn
notion that a penal institution was the proper place to sort out those
in need of penal treatment from those -whose condition calls for
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hospital care. The only other explanation, which may in some cases
be the true one, is that disposition was effected in ignorance of the
report; if this be the case, it may be expected that the analysis of
later results will be more encouraiging in this regard.
For the disposition of those diagnosed as mentally defective there
are other explanations. During most of the period covered by this
report the Department for Defective Delinquents at Bridgewater was
so crowded that the Commissioner of Correction found it necessary
to request thd courts to discontinue making commitments to that
institution ;5 for practical purposes, therefore, the defective delinquent
law, an extremely progressive piece of legislation in which Massa-
chusetts was the pioneer has for the present almost ceased to function,
and will not resume its function until legislative relief is forthcoming.
Of the seventy-one mentally defective defendants only sixteen were
committed to the Department for Defective Delinquents in the two
years. Nearly every sort of disposition is found in the rest of the
group, including probation for eight! The practical results of some
of these dispositions will be cited later on.
As for the other diagnoses, little need be said here. One psycho-
path was placed on probation, and the other obtained a nolle prosequi;
one epileptic was sent to the State Prison, and the other was found
not guilty.
Before proceeding to a further discussion of the practical opera-
tion of the law, a few words should be devoted to the amendment
passed in 1929 and to two judicial decisions of interest. The amend-
ment referred to is found as Chapter 105 of the Acts of 1929, and
provides that the report of the examiners shall be accessible to the
probation officer of the court in addition to the parties named in the
original law, viz. the court, the district attorney and the attorney
for the accused. The purpose of the change was to make clear the
probation officer's right to the information contained -in the report;
inasmuch as the court is expected to obtain a report from the proba-
tion officer before imposing sentence, it is only proper that the latter
should be in a position to inform the court fully as to the defendant's
mental state as well as his record and-social history. To a moderate
degree at least this change has worked well, and many of the officers
carefully inspect the mental report in advance. Unfortunately in
some courts a system has not yet been worked out (perhaps in part
on account of the high pressure at which the officers must work)
"For the laws relating to defective delinquents, see General Laws,
Chapter 123, Secs. 113-124, as amended.
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which provides for the securing of this informatiori in ample season.
It is safe to expect, however, that this defect will be remedied as
experience with the value of the reports accumulates. In 1930 an
amendment was proposed, making examinable all persons indicted for
an offense punishable by life imprisonment; this failed of passage. 6
One question sometimes raised has been whether the making of
a report as directed by the statute is necessary to constitute a fair
trial, or whether failure to make the examination deprived the de-
fendant of a right. This question was settled finally by the decision
of the Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Commonwealth v.
Vallarelli et al.. handed down November 26, 1930.7 Briefly, Vallarelli
was one of four defendants convicted (of robbery) on March 8, 1929.
Four days later the probation officer reported to the clerk that the
defendants had previously been convicted of a felony, whereupon the
Department was asked to examine and report. Reports were filed the
following day, indicating that three of the four were not remarkable
mentally, but that the fourth, one Polcarri, appeared to be hallucinated
in the visual and auditory spheres, and that "he shows sufficient
evidenqe of mental 4isease to require further observation under
Section 100 at Bridgewater". All four were sentenced to the State
Prison, and counsel then filed motions for a new trial on the grounds
that they had been deprived of a fair trial, the three by being tried
with a co-defendant whom they alleged to be of unsound mind, and
Polcarri by reason of the Department's findings. The. trial judge
denied the motions, and the matter went up to the full bench for
decision. The denial of the motions was upheld on the ground that
the petitioners presumably (!) knew of their previous records, and
therefore might have raised the issue at the trial. As to Polcarri, the
court said: "The report of the Department of Mental Diseases con-
cerning Polcarri's falls far short of indicating that he was of unsound
mind when the crime was alleged to have been committed, or when
the trial took place, or even at any time thereafter. It simply in-
dicates that several days after the termination of the trial he showed,
in the opinion of two physicians, sufficient evidence of mental disease
to require furher observation-no presumption can be indulged in
favor of irresponsibility for Polcarri for criminal conduct or of his
insanity at the trial." (The reader should observe here that the report
is literally construed). The most significant statement as to the pur-
pose and scope of the law follows: "--it is plain that noncompliance
GHouse Bill 38 (1930).
7Commonwealth v. Vallarelli et al., 273 Mass. 240.
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with the provisions of said Section 100A as amended does not in-
validate the trial as a matter of law. The terms of that section contain
no such intimation. It is an important statutory provision, but its
design is to forward the administration of public justice, not to put
into the hands of those charged with crime a new weapon of defence.
There is express finding 'by the judge to the effect that the probation
officer and clerk were ignorant until after the verdict of facts which
rendered said Section 100A applicable to any of the defendants".
That this point of view is wise will probably be generally admitted.
To interpret the examination as a sine qua non of due trial would
place an unfair burden on the Department and would add one to the
many still-existing means of reversal and delay. For practical pur-
poses, the insistence by the judges that the report be at hand makes
it an essential without the disadvantage which would arise from a
statutory mandate.
The other case of interest is found as Commonwealth V. Soares.8
On May 22, 1930 Soaris was convicted of murder in the first degree.
The first exception submitted to the Supreme Court was based upon
the contention that compliance with Section 100A is a condition
precedent to placing the defendant on trial. It was further claimed
that the report as filed failed to "determine his mental condition". As
a matter of fact, Soaris had developed a depression following the
killing, and the report stated that he was unfit to stand trial, adding
that he should be sent to a hospital until his recovery. He was com-
mitted to Bridgewater State Hospital, recovered, and was tried. The
court held that the reports of the Department's examiners and of
the medical director of the Bridgewater State Hospital constituted I
compliance with the statute, but did not expressly decide whether such
compliance was a condition precedent. The decision, however, re-
ferred to the case of Commonwealth v. Vallarelli, thus by implication
deciding the latter question in the negative.
These decisions illustrate the well nigh conclusive character
attributed by the courts to the reports of the Department, and should'
serve to warn the examiners to make their reports accurate and based
upon careful examination of the defendant.
In order to make the reports clearer and more enlightening a
change was made (April 1930) in the form used, adding a section
entitled "Psychiatric Findings". The Department in calling the ex-
aminers' attention to this change, conimented as follows: "This has
appeared desirable in view of the fact that the statute calls for a
sCommonwealth v. Soaris, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1931) 973.
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report upon 'the mental condition of the accused,' as well as upon
the 'existence of any mental disease or defect which would affect
his criminal responsibility'. The bare statement that--there is 'no
mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal responsibil-
ity' is hardly better than no report unless corroboration is furnished in
the form of the results of the examination. The court in such an
instance is no better off in obtaining guidance for its disposition than
if it relied upon the legal presumption of sanity alone". By using
this section adequately,'the examiners have an opportunity to demon-
strate to the courts and attorneys of the Commonwealth the true
significance of a psychiatric examination, and to show the basis upon
which their final conclusion on the case rests.
As has been the case in earlier years, instances still occur (though
less frequently than before) in which the examiners show themselves
ready to strain a point in making the defendant out as fully com-
petent. For example:
"In our opinion, the prisoner is definitely feeble-minded, but he
has not sufficient defect to affect his criminal responsibility. We find
no evidence of mental disease."
This man, with" a long record, diagnosed as feeble-minded
without a psychometric, was said to be "responsible." As a result he
was sentenced to two months in the House of Correction for breaking
and entering, when a firm stand by the examiners might have -brought
about the more desirable solution of commitment as a defective delin-
quent. He had, as a matter of fact, been examined while serving a
preyious sentence. He had then been found to have a mental age of
10 yrs., and his commitment as a defective had been urged. The
criminal record of this man (down to November 1931) is of interest
as showing how a feeble-minded person may continue almost in-
definitely to impose upon society despite the facilities available for his
indeterminate segregation.
7/10/19 Larceny. Continued.
5/22/20 Larceny. $20 fine.
1/28/21 Larceny. Dismissed.
9/19/21 Breaking and Entering Probation.
10/20/21 Larceny. Filed-returned to Superior Court.
10/20/21 Surrendered from probation. 2 mos. House of Correction.
10/16/22 Assault and Battery Probation.
10/25/22 Drunkenness Filed.
2/28/23. Surrendered. Probation.
11/27/23 Non support. 3 mos. House of Correction-suspended
sentence.
3/20/24 Violation of probation. 3 mos. H. of C.
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8/28/24 Non support. Discharged.
8/28/24 Assault and Battery on wife. Dismissed.
3/14/25 Larceny. 9 mos. H. of C_ Appealed.
4/22/25 Same charge (Superior Court). 5 mos. B. of C.
5/19/26 Larceny. 6 mos. H. of C.
2/ 6/27 Drunkenness. Released by Probation Officer.
3/ 8/27 Drunkenness. Released by Probation Officer.
4/ 6/27 Breaking and Entering. 1 year. H. of C.
7/ 2/28 Breaking and Entering. 10 mos. H. of C.
8/ 6/29 Breaking and Entering. 2 mos. H. of C.
5/16/30 Exposing and keeping liquor. 1 month. H. of C.
7/ 2/30 Assault and Battery. 6 mos. H. of C.
11/13/31 Exposing and keeping liquor. 1 month. H. of C. and
$200 fine.
It seems fair to say that the two psychiatric examinations made upon
this defendant might well have indicated to the court, quite aside
from his lengthy record, the fact that society would be much better
off by his permanent segregation.
Further examples follow:
"As a result of our examination, we do not find any evidence of
mental disease. He is feeble-minded, of the moron type, but in our
opinion this does not affect his criminal responsibility."
Again no psychometric was needed to satisfy the examiners that this
man was a moron, yet they practically assured the court that this
degree of mental defect need not be considered. Fortunately the
court came to a different conclusion, based on its own psychiatric
knowledge, and committed the accused to the Department for De-
fective Delinquents.
"He is not suffering from any mental disease, which would affect
his criminal responsibility, despite the fact that he is mentally defective.
C.A.-22M.A. Stanford 9.9 1. Q. 14 yr. basis--70 M.A. Perf. 10."
This is by far the most serious case, since the defendant is charged
with murder and might conceivably be convicted in the first degree.
Yet we are told that a mental age of 9 9/12 years, or on the 16 year
basis, an I. Q. of 61 is no factor to be considered in such a case! In
several similar cases recently mental defect of no greater extent
has been successfully urged by examiners upon courts and prosecutors
as diminishing "responsibility." It seems hardly sound psychiatrically
to take the position that mental defect of such degree cannot be con-
sidered a mitigating factor.
A case in which a recommendation went astray may be cited
here. A boy seventeen years of age was examined in May. 1929 while
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held on a charge of breaking and entering, and was reported to be
distinctly feeble-minded, with a mental age of ten years. He was
given probation, and in September 1929 was examined again at the
request of the court. His commitment as a defective delinquent was
strongly recommended then. On September 17, 1929 he was accord-
ingly committed to the Department for Defective Delinquents, but
on September 25 the court ordered the finding of defective delin-
quency vacated, and the prisoner returned to probation! Since that
time he has been convicted again of larceny, has received probation
again, and when surrendered on August 4, 1931 by the probation
officer he was again placed on probation! The confidence of the
court in this mentally defective delinquent seems greater than that
of the psychiatrists or of the probation officer who has to deal with
himl This case, is, of course, unusual, as are the preceding ones.
They may serve, however, as illustrations of the care required in
making reports, and of the further fact that sometimes even the best
of reports may be disregarded. Despite these aberrations, however, it
is nevertheless a fact that in general the reports are made as carefully
as the exigencies of the case permit, and that the courts pay attention
to them, even though 'on occasion they choose to follow their "judicial
sense" instead of psychiatric advice.
The confidence shown by the members of the bar in the fairness
and ability of the examiners is well illustrated by this quotation from
a letter sent to the Department by a psychiatrist:
"I was asked to see this man for the defense, but I called
attention to the fact that this is probably a case for the Department
of Mental Diseases to examine. The attorney said, to his knowledge
that he had not been examined, but that he would be willing to
abide by the report of such an examination if made. I was very
glad, therefore, to be able to tell him this morning that such an
examination had been made and the doctor said he would see to it
that the report got to Court."
Attorneys realize that the examinations are not only competent
but impartial, a fact of which judicial notice was taken by our
Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth v. Devereaux.9 As a
result, "battles of experts" continue to be virtually unknown in
criminal cases.
With the increased efficiency of the superior courts in reporting,
the number of cases in which a report is requested on very short
notice has not decreased. This is primarily due to the fact that the
gCommonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391.
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district courts have not exhibited a corresponding increase of effi-
ciency in notifying the Department of defendants who are examinable
under the law. The statute clearly indicates by its wording an ex-
pectation that the court of first instance will report those defendants
with previous convictions of a felony who are bound over for the
Grand Jury. The probation officer is called upon to know of the
defendant's record, even though jurisdiction is declined, so there is
no reason why the lower court should not do its part in carrying
out the law. In 1929 only 73, or 19.6% of the cases reported, came
to the notice of the Department from the District Courts. The
Administrative Committee has called this to the attention of the
District Courts, as have several of the District Attorneys, and an
improvement is being noted. If only the District Courts will do
their part, ample time for proper examination will be available be-
fore indictment is brought, since the great majority of cases originate
in a finding of probable cause in the District Court rather than by
indictment by the Grand Jury. The Administrative Committee has
been most cooperative in attempting to bring about a more effective
reporting of these cases, and there is every reason to believe that
this difficulty will be minimized as time goes on. That hasty examina-
tions, made in the detention room while the judge is waiting to
impose sentence, are unsatisfactory and unfair goes without saying.
On the other hand, there are times when delay in making such report
may seriously inconvenience the court, .and might even (in counties
other than Suffolk or Middlesex) result in a delay of several months
in disposition.
No law is self-administering, and no law functions perfectly; to
this rule the Briggs Law is no exception. Nevertheless, in spite of
certain difficulties which have been pointed out, we may still insist
that the Briggs Law is operating with steadily increasing efficiency;
that the courts, prosecutors and attorneys for the defense are ex-
hibiting a keener consciousness of the value of the service rendered
by the Department of Mental Diseases under the statute; and that
as a means of eliminating partisan expert testimony in criminal trials,
of securing a truer justice for the mentally abnormal defendant, and
of giving to society a greater assurance of safety, this unusually
advanced piece of legislation merits a wider application to our
system of criminal justice.
